Damn, This Guy Won't Quit!

Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) of Soldiers For The Truth is at it again. Earlier, I discussed the quality of his reporting on the USS San Francisco grounding, and not only found it to be wanting, but determined that Perry was approaching asshattedness. (Asshat: someone who wears their own ass as a hat.)

In his latest article posted at sftt.org, titled "The 'Navigator's Paradox' "Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) has not only crossed that line, but tripped over it and fallen flat on his face. Here are some excerpts:

"An article by Christopher Drew in The New York Times last week contained one intriguing piece of information: An attached chart depicted the probable location of the submarine farther west than the optimum track of a fast transit from its home port in Guam to its planned destination in Brisbane, Australia.

"If confirmed, another question arises: Was this position determined by the presence of a senior officer onboard for some reason? Was he to be disembarked on one of the islands of the Federated States of Micronesia for a return flight to his home base, while the San Francisco then continued on toward its planned liberty port of Brisbane?

"Who was this officer? A close review of the numerous Navy press releases and other communications concerning the San Francisco revealed the names of many officers who would be reasonably associated with the San Francisco, but the presence of one officer has gone completely unmentioned: Commander, Submarine Group Seven.

"More questions emerge: Why the silence? Was he on board? Did he drive the thinking of the San Francisco’s skipper and navigator? Did they cut a few corners in order to deliver him to a planned flight home? Did these dedicated officers unwittingly attribute to their charts an inappropriate accuracy that allowed them to deliver on a tight schedule?"

The officer Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) is accusing of being on board, with no real evidence, is RADM David Gove, Commander, Submarine Group SEVEN. (On the CSG7 webpage, click on "The Admiral" for Rear Admiral Gove's biography.) Perry continues to intimate that a "senior officer" may have been on board, although he no longer attributes this to "reliable sources". As I stated earlier, my "frequently drunken sources" say that this was not the case. Perry really is a one-trick pony-- he's convinced himself that submarines only have problems because there are senior officers on board. Maybe the reason that RADM Gove is not making a lot of noise in the press is that he is the first Flag Officer in the San Francisco's chain of command, and as such will likely be the Court Martial convening authority. Maybe he's just trying to maintain some public perception of impartiality. Do you think that might be a more reasonable explanation?

Here's the next piece of proof that Perry's sphincter muscle is wrapped tightly around his forehead; the new article claims that the position of the submarine is "west of the optimum track for a fast transit to Brisbane". It wonders if this senior officer was to be disembarked on one of the Micronesian islands to return home (hopefully one with an airport). Well, Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.), I think you're kind of reaching there. Why not get the free trip to Australia while you're on the boat? I won't go too much into it, but submarines do travel on a track given to them by a higher authority; it's part of something called "waterspace management". This seems to be Perry's train of thought: San Francisco was further west than they should have been! They'd be wasting fuel! Well, Lt. Perry, unlike the ships you're familiar with, submarines don't need to refuel but once every 20 years or so, and San Fran's got a pretty full tank. Maybe for Lt. Perry's next article, he'll find out that Sub Group 7 is the waterspace management authority for the Western Pacific (they are) and figure that the track assigned to San Francisco was approved by people working for RADM Gove (it was). This will be more proof of a great Govian conspiracy! He was probably in the pay of the Chinese! The San Francisco grounding was a plot to distract the people from problems in Iraq!

I'll probably edit this later with more hyperlinks and examples of Perry's fuzzy thinking. When I do, though, I doubt that it will change my final assessment: Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.), you, sir, are an asshat when it comes to writing about submarines.

Update: WillyShake at Unconsidered Trifles has a suggestion to help me avoid the "bad word" controversy brewing in the comments. (To ensure there's no confusion: SubBasket is my wife, and her comment was meant to be humorous - except for the new basket part. I'm just glad she didn't see what I had to say about the Democratic Underground DUmmies in this post.)

Update 2136 06 Feb: Edited to correct misspelling, punctuation, add a sentence to the update above to make it funnier, and amend one sentence to make my point clearer. I was just about to amend the portion on waterspace management issues to more clearly dismantle Perry's mistaken assumptions, but realized that I might be approaching the bounds of security classification issues if I did. (Since Perry seems to operate in the world of make-believe, he doesn't have this concern.) Also, I figured out something else that bothered me about the article. In the earlier, more sleep-inducing part of the article that discussed navigation techniques (which reached conclusions that were, in my opinion, just plain wrong), Perry's whole tone seems to be along the lines of, "They aren't doing navigation the exact same way I learned to do it 20+ years ago! Because I learned to do it a certain way, any other way is wrong, despite any technological advances." So, in addition to being an asshat, he seems to be something of a Luddite. I'm surprised he didn't complain that the San Francisco crew didn't know how to use a sextant.
Anyway, since sftt.org still has a link to me, I figure he may see this (and I'm also thinking about writing him). I renew my invitation to Perry to provide me with any additional information he has to back up his conclusions, including any additional information he has on the supposed presence of RADM Gove on board the San Francisco, and I'll publish it without editing. I'll still rip the hell out of anything that smells foolish, though. Remember, Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.), sometimes good people, like the Captain and crew of the San Francisco, can follow all the rules and still have bad things happen to them. It's called "life", and it's not some grand conspiracy (theological implications notwithstanding)...

Irresponsible Monday Morning Quarterbacking

Do journalists for semi-major web publications make unsubstantiated charges that further their political agenda? Is Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.), DefenseWatch Contributing Editor who publishes articles online at Soldiers for the Truth, a total asshat? These are the questions I intend to investigate in this hard-hitting blog entry that will see if the 29-year retired Lieutenant is simply following the orders of his high-ranking (retired) boss, or if he comes by this particular agenda on his own.
Okay, not really... but I am quite pissed about some of the little snippets thrown into this article by the above-mentioned Raymond Perry currently [Edit 1207 26 Jan: now about a quarter of the way down on the front page] on the front page of the Soldiers for the Truth website. In discussing the recent grounding of USS San Francisco (SSN-711) he throws out these little gems:
"Reliable sources indicate that a senior officer was embarked on San Francisco. Could her skipper have been showboating? Did his presence aboard the sub intimidate her skipper? This has been a pertinent issue in earlier submarine mishaps (See “Why are Navy COs Getting the Ax?” DefenseWatch, March 2, 2004). It is critical for the Navy to investigate the potential involvement of a senior officer in order to determine the full account of why the San Francisco accident occurred (also see “A Second Look at the Greeneville Collision,” DefenseWatch, Apr. 1, 2004)."

All in all, the article up to this point is, to be honest, about as factually accurate (if boring) as you might expect from someone who has no clue about the differences between submarine navigation and surface ship navigation. By bringing up these "questions" (read: accusations), we see that Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) is really interested in continuing his quest to blame all submarine accidents on the presence of senior riders onboard. In his "A Second Look at the Greeneville Collision", he notes that the senior riders onboard the USS Oklahoma City (SSN-723) and USS Hartford (SSN-768) during their recent collision and grounding, respectively, were both relieved of their duties. The focus in this article is questioning why the senior officer aboard the Greeneville was not similarly relieved. (The fact that the senior officers aboard the Hartford and Oklahoma City were the direct operational commander, either deployed or normal, of the respective boat's COs, while the SubPac Chief of Staff on the Greeneville was not, apparently has no relevance in Lt. Perry's world.)

For those unfamiliar with attack submarine life, here's the "straight skinny": I can count on one hand the number of underways I had in which no one other than the ship's crew was on board. Subs almost always have riders aboard, frequently senior to the CO. While the recent accidents may have been on submarines in which a senior rider is present (and I have seen nothing to indicate that there was a senior rider aboard the San Francisco other than this article), I think we can conservately estimate that 99.9+% of underways with senior officers aboard do not "make the news".

"Showboating"? "Intimidated"? These words do not in any way describe the CDR Mooney that I am honored to have known, and do a great disservice to his dedication and service to our country. And, by the way, Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.), if a submariner were to "showboat" for a visiting dignitary, there are better ways to do it than run at a flank bell to make up ground after a field day. (Maybe that's how skimmers did it in the little less than 29 years it took you to make Lieutenant; subs are a little more exciting.) And, I fail to see how someone could be "intimidated" into not having the fathometer manned properly, as seems to be the thrust of the earlier, more boring part of your screed. Maybe you could also investigate how many suicides of Chief of Naval Operations happened prior to meeting your employer.

OK, I'm calmed down a little now. In all fairness, a review of some of the articles Perry has written about other subjects seems to show that he is generally fair, if a little naive. As far as Col. Hackworth is concerned... he does seem genuinely interested in improving the military and getting better equipment for the troops, and if he doesn't like flag officers too much, well, some of them piss me off as well. For example, I pretty much agree with the points he makes in this article. But, it does seem that you frequently see him being trotted out on the various news programs if someone is needed support a more defeatist agenda from a military point of view. All in all, I think the "questions" raised in the article do little to advance the cause of determining why the San Francisco ran aground, and unfairly impugn the character of CDR Mooney.

Postscript: I found this article while searching for this guest column, which I think makes for interesting, non-sub related reading.

Bell-ringer 1558 21 Jan: CDR Salamander weighs in with an earlier discussion on the political ties of Col. Hackworth, who runs the DefenseWatch organization for which Perry works. Although I didn't answer the "asshat" question I rhetorically posed above, the good Commander provides his vote in the comments.

Update 1208 26 Jan: Now that sftt.org has linked to me, I guess there's a chance that Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) himself might read my little snit-fit above. If so, I'd like to offer him a chance to respond on this page; I'll post whatever you send me, Ray. Just know, though, that my "frequently intoxicated sources" are saying something different than your "reliable sources" about who may or may not have been on the boat during the grounding, so be prepared to defend yours.

Lt. (Ret) Perry Writes Again!

My old buddy Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) has written another article on a submarine mishap for Soldiers For The Truth -- this one on the recent USS Philadelphia collision. I discussed my objections to (Ret.) Lt. Perry's earlier articles on the San Francisco grounding here, here, and here in response to his stories here and here (Edit 2348 14 Sep: One of the articles I complained about now seems to be missing from their website... I guess they thought it was too stupid to retain. Also, the links in my original posts don't work anymore, but I corrected the links to Perry's original articles at the bottom of the comments in a couple of my posts). In many of these posts, I postulated that Lt. Perry (Ret.) was an "asshat". Has he overcome his propensity for sphincter-cranial insertion? I'll answer that question later on in this post.

Let's look at some of what Lt. (Ret.) Perry has to say:

"Perhaps the real question is how a large ship like the 625-foot, 52,000 ton vessel like the Yaso Aysen could get so close to a submarine without any maneuver to prevent collision?
"Maybe it was because it gets awfully dark at sea on some nights and ships are normally almost silent. My suspicion is that Philadelphia was not using her radar in order to make identification as a US submarine more difficult for those that would do her harm. Philadelphia's sonar should have detected the Yaso Aysen and shown a constant bearing, a clear caution to Philadelphia...
"...The one element that will affect CDR Oxholm's future is the Submariner's Professional Ethos, which tells submarine skippers to maneuver early on to avoid collision regardless of the rules of the road. This is because a submarine is always more vulnerable to damage than a surface ship.
"Thus, depending on what the investigating team discovers, CDR Oxholm's superiors might take a dim view of his ship colliding with another. Yet, unless the investigators discover some kind of culpable negligence or an intentional act that flies in the face of prudent seamanship, I believe that CDR Oxholm will ultimately survive."

Perry asks some reasonable questions. I'll provide my response after I get back from running some errands...

Post continued 2243 14 Sep: I'm back, and I've deleted the first spam comment already (so you don't think that Ninme's just blabbering about nothing in her comment, there used to be a spam comment above it.)

Back to Lt. Perry's article -- actually, it's about as good as one could expect from a skimmer. He apparently doesn't understand the concept of "baffles" as it applies to sonar, especially a sonar sphere on the surface. (For non-submariners, "baffles" are the area in back of the boat that sonar just can't see very well, because the boat's in the way. The width of the baffles varies, but you really can't see much about 45 degrees either side of dead astern). Obviously, a ship overtaking you would come out of the baffles, and you wouldn't see it on sonar until it was coming alongside; and if it was on a collision course, you probably wouldn't pick it up at all -- particularly with a ship that long (the propellers and engine room being in the back). He might be thinking we'd pick it up on the towed array, but subs don't have that deployed when they're on the surface.

He also figures the Philly wasn't using their radar, assuming that we wouldn't want a terrorist speedboat with ESM gear advanced enough to identify a BPS-15 radar set to be able to pick it up (/sarcasm). He could be right; I really don't know enough about current Fifth Fleet SOP to say if we do that or not. However, submarines do carry a commercial Furuno radar set that they can mount on the bridge, and almost every boat uses it if it's not broken. (You don't have to click on this link unless you want to see an official Navy document that says submarine training facilities have commercial Furuno radar as standard equipment in their navigation trainers.) If the Furuno is broken, I would assume that most prudent COs would go ahead and use their BPS-15.

Earlier in the article, Perry mentions that "later reports indicate that the Yaso Aysen approached the USS Philadelphia from the submarine's port quarter and overrode the submarine, damaging the screw and rudder, the sailplanes, a periscope and denting Philadelphia's hull." If he's going only based on media reports I can't really fault him for that, but I think the merchant hit the Philly's starboard side. I base that on the damage to the starboard fairwater plane in the second picture in my post below, and no apparent damage to the port plane. (It's hard to see, but I have the high-res version of the pic.)

Finally, he states his belief that Captain Oxholm will "survive" (not get fired). If the Submarine Force follows tradition, the CO will almost certainly be fired, even if he didn't violate any Rules of the Road other than the General Prudential Rule in Rule 17. He might have a point here, but not for the reason he states. I'm starting to think that the Navy might not want to "admit guilt", as it were, by firing the CO when fault for the collision is still to be determined. Since I have confidence that CDR Oxholm is a good CO, that might not be the worst thing for the ship and crew. I also assume that there won't be other COs who figure they can run into other ships without repercussions since one CO didn't get fired...

Conclusion: In his latest article, Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) displays ignorance, but not asshattishness.

Staying at PD...

Submarine Quartermasters -- My Take

Last weekend, I briefly discussed an article by Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) giving his further opinions on the San Francisco grounding. (I discussed a couple of his earlier articles on this subject here and here.) In my first post on this article, I talked a little about Perry's contention that the Joint Duty requirement imposed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act has caused submarine COs to be less proficient submariners. I was going to expand on this by referencing a really dumb GAO report I remember reading that basically said the Navy wouldn't need as many submarine officers if they only did shore duty that related to submarining, but I couldn't find this report at the GAO website, which makes me think it was classified; therefore, I won't discuss it in detail. (It was really idiotic, though -- you'll have to trust me on this.) I don't know about the rest of you, but I personally needed shore duty time to recharge my batteries (even the "shore duty" I spent doing a six-month deployment on an aircraft carrier was necessary from the point of view of my sanity).
Another point Perry brings up seems to have a lot of support within the submarine community, and even more within the "no longer active duty" segment. Excerpts:

"There is a second potential contributing element to the San Francisco collision. The Navy several years ago merged the Quartermaster rating with the Electronics Technician rating as a means of saving money during a period of personnel cutbacks. What did the Submarine Force lose in eliminating this professional set of sailors, and was it worth it?...

"...Updating charts to ensure all applicable Notices to Mariners have been entered is a mundane and never ending but truly vital task. To a Quartermaster, it is a key element of his professional performance. To an Electronics Technician, it might be, at best, another administrative task...

"...A third factor revealed in the probe is the common and expected practice of employing dead-reckoning to show if a ship is standing into danger. The practice is to lay out the ship’s present course and speed for the next few position fix intervals or four hours in the open ocean (See Chapter 7 of “The American Practical Navigator”). This practice presents a visual display of potential danger immediately available to those navigating the ship, if its course and speed are not changed. Quartermasters do this in their sleep as second nature and a core element of their profession. To an Electronics Technician this too would be another administrative task among many.

"Quartermasters know charts and the potential inaccuracies inherent in a chart based on information predating satellite mapping of the world (see “The Navigator’s Paradox,” DefenseWatch, Feb. 1, 2005). When a Quartermaster sees a series of soundings indicating a shoaling bottom not shown on the chart, it should, and does, set off loud warning bells.
Electronics Technicians are professionals too. They work hard in their chosen field. But each professional field within the Navy operates to different sets of priorities. When the Submarine Force did away with its Quartermaster rating and rolled its responsibilities into another rating, some things that were done instinctively disappeared."

Perry is right in that the Submarine Force merged the QM rate into the Sub ET rate. A lot of submariners, including myself, opposed this move, but not for the reasons Perry states. Many believe that this move eliminated Quartermasters from submarines; nothing could be farther from the truth. In actuality, it was simply an administrative change; the new Quartermasters were those ETs who carried the 14QM Navy Enlisted Classification. They have basically the same schooling that the old quartermasters had, do the same job, and have to complete the same qual cards as before. (Actually, the qual card is more extensive now.) The rating conversion was more of an administrative paper chase than an attempt to save money, although I'm sure that's how the Navy sold it to Congress. The same merger made Navy Interior Communications Specialist and Radionmen into ETs with their own NEC. About the same time, they turned all submariner Torpedomen's Mates into Machinists Mates.

Granted, these new ETs have to have more in-rate knowledge than the old QMs did, but from this submariners point of view, that's a good thing. The 14QMs still do the same things the old QMs did; they still aren't allowed to go out on liberty until their QM work is done; they still plot hand DRs, prepare charts, and put their dicks on the chart table when the ship is going to PD at night (OK, maybe not all of them do that, but at least one of them on my first boat did.)

Here's what I didn't like about the ET rating conversion and QMs: while the junior QMs were not really any different, the senior QM onboard, called the Assistant Navigator (ANAV for short) didn't have to be a 14QM. All sub ET could qualify as ANAV, even if they were a radioman, ICman, or Nav ET guy as their primary job in their earlier tours. Since each boat will only have one senior Sailor on board assigned as ANAV, the quality of this person was probably the most important factor in how good the boat was in the navigation area. Since qualification as ANAV looked really good on any Sub ETs record, I worried that boats might qualify a guy just as he was leaving (the "good-bye kiss") and he'd show up at the next boat as ANAV without that much real-world quartermastering experience.

So is this what happened to the San Francisco? No -- her ANAV was one of the best in the fleet, and had always been a quartermaster. This is another reason why I think the 711 grounding was such a bad roll of the dice; if one of the best QMs in the fleet could have it happen on his watch, the boats with old Radiomen as their ANAV would seemingly be more susceptible to any problems. Bottom line: The ET conversion might not have been a very good idea, but blaming the San Francisco grounding on it is really stretching a point.

At this point I'd normally call Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.) an asshat, but I've heard through the grapevine that he's in cordial E-mail contact with someone who is hopefully setting him straight, and who says he got an answer from Perry by being polite. So, Ray, if you're out there, I won't call you an asshat in this entry, and if you'd like to defend yourself and your conclusions on this page, just send it in and I'll post it. However, if it displays any asshattish properties, I reserve the right to point that out.

(Edited for spelling and clarity 1014 20 April)

Lt.(Ret) Perry Rides Again

Well, Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret), who recently wrote a couple of ridiculous pieces on the San Francisco grounding that I fisked here and here, opened up his pie-hole again about the submarine force. While he doesn't specifically bring up his baseless charges that a senior officer was riding the San Fran, he shows that he's clearly being fitted for a tin-foil asshat with lines like this in his latest article (emphasis mine):

"...More recently, the Navy processed those deemed guilty of grounding the USS San Francisco via Article 15. In this case, the hearing for the former Commanding officer, Cmdr. Kevin Mooney, was held at a time that appears to have been chosen to minimize news coverage.

Mooney’s Admiral’s Mast (an Article 15 hearing convened by a Navy flag officer) was held on a Saturday morning in Yokosuka, Japan. Given the time zone difference this hearing was effectively held late on a Friday evening in the United States. I believe this was chosen precisely so that the entire weekend would intervene in the modern 24-hour news cycle so that by Monday morning it would be old news.

Additionally - unlike the admiral’s mast following the Greeneville-Ehime Maru collision - this hearing was held well before the completion of the formal investigation, leading me to wonder if there was a reason that senior Navy leadership wanted this hearing to be well in the past when the investigation was completed and approved."

Normally, I might agree with someone who says that the Navy senior leadership handled the punishments associated with the San Francisco grounding badly, but in the case of Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.), I just can't do it. Good ol' Ray seems to be saying that CDR Mooney should have been taken to a court martial; this may have given Captain Mooney more of a chance to defend himself, but I don't think that's what Perry was wanting. Also, he never comes out and says it, but I can't help wondering if his belief that the Navy was trying to "cover up" the NJP (which explains the official press release they put out, I guess) was because of his continuing belief in the fictitious "senior rider". I'd write him again, but since he didn't answer last time, I probably won't waste the bandwidth.

Staying at PD...

Update 0059 06 Apr: Darn! I thought I might have invented the term "tin-foil asshat" in the post above, but it turns out it's been used before...

Now He's Just Making Stuff Up

Noted as a sphincter-brimmed writer for Soldiers For The Truth, Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is apparently that website's "expert" on submarine matters. I've previously discussed the accuracy of his writing, and I've had a good time doing so. It's apparent that he doesn't read my comments, though, because he continues to put out ridiculous commentary that has no real basis in reality.

His most recent article starts out pretty well, mostly because he seems to have lifted it straight from Bob Hamilton's article in The New London Day on the possibility that the USS Philadelphia and M/V Yaso Aysen were involved in a "crossing" vs. "overtaking" scenario in their recent collision. [I had discussed this a few days earlier, and some of my thoughts seem to be echoed in the article as well -- good for you, Lt. Perry (Ret)!]

Later on, though, he gets into the part of the article where he has to provide his own thoughts, and here's where it starts to go downhill:

"Cdr Oxholm and his Officer of the Deck were obligated by the Submarine Force Ethos to turn away 10,000 yards earlier, regardless of the Rules of the Road. He did not and has paid the price.
"Commanding Officers have a document called Standing Orders that interpret law and regulation and give personal direction to Officer's of the Deck. It is surprising how few COs will say simple and direct things like "Don't have a collision" in Standing Orders. In my observation, the best COs always had simple things up front in their orders, like: "what ever else you are doing don't have a collision."
"Officers of the Deck solve many problems and cope with many things during their watch. Sometimes they may allow the wrong thing to be at the top of their "to do list." Such direct and simple guidance by their CO goes a long way to make sure the priorities of the Officer of the Deck are kept right."

Well, I can't say that he's an asshat here -- that would imply that his head was up his ass, and that can't be, because he had to have some room to put his hand up there so he could pull that number out of it. Submarines have to maneuver when they get within 10,000 yards of a surface contact? Where the hell did he come up with that? Now, without getting too much into the classified nature of the COs Standing Orders, I can say that they do mention a couple of range numbers, none of which are that high, and the highest number is the range at which you should inform the CO; the number for maneuvering is much lower. If a sub had to maneuver off the track of any ship that got within 10Kyds, they'd never be able to make it back into port.

Regarding the CO's Standing Orders: I've discussed them before in the context of the San Francisco grounding, and I agree that they aren't the most perfect document. I've also mentioned that they're a Sub Force-generated document, and the CO doesn't really have much latitude in personalizing them. That being said, Lt. (Ret) Perry's complaint that they don't "...say simple and direct things like 'Don't have a collision'... " is pretty much the most retarded thing I've ever read. I really don't think that the OOD (who was a Department Head) came down from the bridge after the collision and thougt, "Man, if only the CO's Standing Orders had reminded me not to have a collision, I would have been OK". I can just imagine the Standing Orders (Ret) Lt. Perry would like to see:
1) Remember to breathe
2) Gravity tends to cause objects to fall
3) Ships stay afloat because of buoyancy
4) You haven't forgotten to breathe, have you?

If I had seen a statement like "Don't have a collision" in a set of standing orders, I would have laughed my ass off, and figured that the person writing them was a skimmer or something. Wait, Perry, Lt. (Ret) was a skimmer himself... ah, I get it now.

Anyway, I've come to the conclusion that (Ret) Perry, Lt., is turning into some sort of a humor writer, and I think that it's great that Soldiers For The Truth is able to provide such chuckles during a time of war. Thanks for making us laugh... it's more important now than ever.

Staying at PD...

A Series of Non-Retractions

Considering that Col. David Hackworth passed on yesterday, I won't use my usual hyperbole in discussing the new San Francisco article by Lt. Raymond Perry, USN (Ret.). Here's an excerpt:

"There are those who would dismiss the grounding as a pure "act of God" with the San Francisco's commander and crew having zero responsibility to foresee or avoid the seamount. Precise and worldwide cartography is expensive, so the mapmakers can produce and update charts only as they are able.
"The profession of the sea has built in cautions and methods whereby navigators are enjoined to do certain things that ensure safety. When passing near hazards or making landfall on an unknown coast, these procedures will tend to keep the ship safe. Only in the last decade have navigators begun to shrink this margin of safety to just a few miles instead of the ship, rather than the tens of miles once used.
"There are procedures for ships that note errors on charts to send messages to the mapmakers advising them of errors or conflicts so that the cartographers can improve them. Two as-yet unanswered questions from the mishap on Jan. 8 are: How many submarines have transited this part of The Carolines archipelago and noted erroneous soundings? And did any of them file a message with the mapmakers as required?
"In moving three submarines to a new homeport in Guam, did the Pacific Submarine Force Commander ask his Staff Oceanographer to review charts near Guam and update those that needed updating?"

While it looks like he may have finally gotten some real information, I note that he still neglects to retract his previous accusations that RADM Gove was riding the San Francisco when she grounded, and until he does, I won't retract my previous characterization of Perry as an asshat.

Going deep...

More Info On The Hartford Collision

There's an article in Stars and Stripes that seems to say the Navy is confirming that USS Hartford took a very serious roll when when was hit; the article in question says the roll was as much as 85 degrees. The fact that the boat was able to continue operating after such a transient is a testimony to the skill of her designers and builders.

Also, Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.), noted skimmer asshat, put in his two cents about the Hartford collision; as usual, his suppositions are the equivalent of suppositories, in that he just pulls stuff out of his ass. He apparently thinks that submariners get hurt from 10-20 degree rolls, even through we routinely practice angles in excess of that. Read his article over at SFTT (Motto: Badgering good men to suicide since 1996) if you want a laugh.